Arkansas Law Review
Volume 73

Number 1

Article 1

August 2020

Freedom of Expression Within the Schoolhouse Gate
Justin Driver
Yale

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal History Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Justin Driver, Freedom of Expression Within the Schoolhouse Gate, 73 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol73/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITHIN THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
Justin Driver*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began contemplating
how the First Amendment’s commitment to “the freedom of
speech” should protect the right of students to introduce their own
ideas into the schoolhouse.1 This constitutional question extended well beyond the matter addressed in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, because that opinion—momentous though it was—held simply that students could refuse to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.2 But Barnette did not establish that
students possessed an affirmative right to advance their own opinions, on topics of their own selection, much less in the face of
school officials’ objections. The right to sit out, in other words,
did not necessarily confer the right to speak out.
This Article examines the history of student rights to affirmative speech, with a focus on threats facing those rights that appear on the horizon. First, as it must, this story begins with the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.3 The Article analyzes the
case’s background, emphasizes the majority’s broad conception
of citizenship, and illuminates the opinion’s deep doctrinal ambiguity. Turning to the dissent, the Article highlights Justice
Black’s narrow conception of citizenship, examines possible
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Professor Mark Killenbeck and
the University of Arkansas Law School for inviting me to deliver the Hartman Hotz Lecture
in Fayetteville, Arkansas, on November 1, 2019. This Article is excerpted and adapted from
my book-length examination of students’ constitutional rights, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, and the Battle for the American Mind (Pantheon Books,
2019). Kevin Kennedy provided invaluable assistance with condensing this book excerpt
into a law review article.
1. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969).
2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626, 628-29, 642 (1943).
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
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motivations for his unusually strident opinion, and demonstrates
that Justice Black’s message resonated more with the American
people than did the Court’s opinion. By marshaling contemporaneous public opinion data, it becomes clear that Tinker should be
understood as an opinion that successfully vindicated constitutional rights in the face of counter-majoritarian opposition.
Second, the Article assesses the strength of Tinker today, arguing that scholars have incorrectly dismissed its continuing significance. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected
students’ speech claims post-Tinker.4 But those decisions should
not be mistaken for indicating that Tinker is now a dead letter.
After recovering Tinker’s contemporary vitality, the Article concludes by identifying two major areas that require renewed judicial attention in the fight to protect student speech rights. A brief
conclusion follows.
II. TINKER AS A
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DECISION
In 1965, a small group of students in Des Moines, Iowa—
including John Tinker (15 years old) and Mary Beth Tinker (13
years old)—formed a plan to protest the Vietnam War by wearing
black armbands to their various schools.5 They hoped that the
armbands would spark conversations about their views and help
in some modest way to mobilize antiwar sentiment.6 When plans
of the impending protest leaked, however, Des Moines school officials hastily arranged a meeting to create a policy announcing
that pupils wearing armbands in school would be suspended until
they agreed to remove the offending pieces of cloth.7 This policy
was necessary, the officials maintained, in order to avoid disruptions they believed would result from the protest.8 In addition to
learning that some students intended to wear nonblack armbands

4. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393, 409-10 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86
(1986).
5. JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES
AND THE 1960S 1-5 (1997).
6. Id. at 4.
7. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
8. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 6.
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as a sort of counter-protest, the officials noted that a former Des
Moines student had been killed in Vietnam and expressed concern
that his friends who remained in school would create a volatile,
hot-tempered environment.9 The antiwar students, undeterred,
proceeded with their plans.10 John Tinker managed to wear his
armband at school through lunchtime, before a teacher finally instructed him to report to the principal’s office for discipline.11
During his half-day at school, several different groups of students
alternately ridiculed him for wearing the armband and beseeched
him to remove it.12 Like her brother, Mary Beth Tinker wore her
armband for much of the school day—until she attracted the notice of her mathematics teacher, who had dedicated the entire previous day of class to condemning student demonstrators and to
announcing that he would eject anyone wearing an armband from
his classroom.13 Throughout the day, her classmates repeatedly
encouraged her to discard the armband before she got into trouble—including at least twice during classes.14 Despite the suspensions, all three students remained steadfast in their convictions, and did not return to school until January, when their
scheduled period of protest had concluded.15 The student protestors filed a lawsuit contending that their suspensions violated the
First Amendment right of free expression, and thus set in motion
what would eventually culminate in the Supreme Court’s most
consequential student rights opinion in its entire history.16
In Tinker, the Supreme Court, by a 7–2 margin, vindicated
the right of students to express their views in school.17 Justice Abe

9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 n.3.
10. Id. at 504.
11. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 23.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 19-20.
14. Id.
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16. For further background information on Tinker, see JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 1-15,
29-66; Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and Unrealized
Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193-1201 (2009); John W. Johnson, Behind the Scenes in Iowa’s Great Case: What Isn’t in the Official Record of Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 473, 473-80
(2000).
17. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-06.
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Fortas issued the majority’s opinion in February 1969.18 Fortas
opened by asserting that the Supreme Court had held for nearly
five decades that students retained First Amendment rights in
school—a claim that he bolstered by citing Meyer v. Nebraska,19
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,20 and Barnette.21 Fortas advanced this
proposition in stirring language, using a turn of phrase that not
only became a staple of judicial opinions, but even entered the
larger national culture: “It can hardly be argued that . . . students
. . . shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”22
If Tinker were memorable only for containing that sentence, the
opinion would nevertheless rank high on the list of the Court’s
momentous defenses of students’ constitutional rights, as that language established the fundamental terms of debate for subsequent
cases. But Tinker also held great significance beyond that lone
sentence.
Two additional, closely-related points in Tinker’s conceptualization of student rights demand attention. First, Fortas made
clear that the state—through its public schools—could not prevent students from expressing particular ideas simply because
their message may counter the state’s own preferred message.23
That the Des Moines school district sought to prohibit students
from expressing an antiwar viewpoint—when it otherwise permitted students to express their viewpoints on a whole range of
issues—rendered the policy constitutionally dubious, according
to Fortas.24 “In our system, state-operated schools may not be
enclaves of totalitarianism,” he wrote.25 “School officials do not
possess absolute authority over their students . . . . In our system,
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses to communicate.”26 Second, linking
the opinion to a broad notion of citizenship, Fortas emphasized
18. Id. at 504.
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923).
20. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925).
21. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 534-35 (1943).
22. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
23. See id. at 509-11.
24. See id. at 510-11.
25. Id. at 511.
26. Id.
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that it would be particularly unwise for a society that values uninhibited public debate to permit schools to suppress views, as
today’s students will soon assume responsibility for maintaining
tomorrow’s civic discourse.27 Some of the most essential learning that occurs in schools happens not during teacher-led classroom instruction, but during “personal intercommunication
among the students,” interactions that Fortas affirmed as embodying “an inevitable . . . [and] an important part of the educational
process.”28
Tinker did not suggest, of course, that schools invariably violated the First Amendment if they placed limitations on student
speech. Fortas’s opinion pointedly observed that the speech at
issue in Tinker did not involve “the length of skirts or the type of
clothing, . . . hair style, or deportment”—matters that began to roil
schools and courts during the 1960s.29 While Fortas’s opinion did
not go so far as to hold that schools could sanction students with
impunity in those areas, Tinker did make clear that it regarded
those issues as distinct from the matter at hand.30
In what instances did the Supreme Court affirmatively authorize schools to prohibit student speech? Here, Tinker contained considerable ambiguity, as the opinion can be understood
to contain three competing approaches for regulating student
speech. While the Court left no doubt that it believed that the Des
Moines school officials overstepped their bounds as measured by
any of these three potential tests, Tinker’s ambiguity as to what
measure actually governed student speech would beset educators
and judges alike in subsequent years.
On Tinker’s most speech-restrictive reading, school officials
may prohibit student expression if they can articulate reasonable
grounds for predicting that the speech will meaningfully hinder
school operations.31 In Fortas’s language, “[T]he record does not
demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511-12.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 507-08.
Id.
See id. at 509.
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interference with school activities.”32 This interpretation has
clearly been the most influential in lower courts.33
On Tinker’s more demanding intermediate interpretation,
however, school officials could not censor speech on merely the
reasonable prediction of disruption; instead, the relevant inquiry
would center on whether the controverted speech actually interfered with school activities.34 “When he is in the cafeteria, or on
the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,”
Fortas wrote, “he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without
colliding with the rights of others.”35 Fortas, assessing Tinker’s
facts through this prism, conceded that some students directed unkind remarks toward the armband wearers outside of class.36 But
he noted that the school witnessed no threats of violence—let
alone violent acts—and that schoolwork had not been compromised.37 The virtually nonexistent record of actual disruption
could hardly justify the schools’ decision to silence student
speech.
Finally, on Tinker’s least speech-restrictive reading, school
officials could not justify prohibiting student expression based on
their classmates’ disruptive reactions to the speech, but instead
must look to whether the speakers themselves disrupted school
activities.38 While students who espouse “unpopular viewpoint[s]” may create “discomfort and unpleasantness,” Tinker
maintained, educators may not censor expression out of a desire
to avoid those sensations.39 To the contrary, protecting dissident
speech was, in Fortas’s telling, intimately connected to the very
core of American identity:

32. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
33. See Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student
Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1285, 1293 (2008).
34. Tinker, 393 U.S at 512-13.
35. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
36. Id. at 508.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 509.
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire
fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.
But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and
our history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.40
Although Justice Hugo Black’s vehement dissent did not distinguish among Tinker’s various tests, he left no doubt that he assigned the majority opinion a flunking mark. Only days shy of
celebrating his eighty-third birthday, Black publicly excoriated
his colleagues by reading aloud a version of his written dissent
from the bench for some twenty minutes—a judicial performance
seldom rivaled not only in its length, but also in its vitriol.41 In
the grand courtroom that invites solemnity, Justice Black used
sarcastic tones to quote from a disfavored precedent, and concluded his jeremiad with the following declaration: “I want it
thoroughly known that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any
part of what the Court does today.”42 The published version of
Black’s dissent made little effort to conceal his deep displeasure.
Justice Black ardently supported free speech rights in most contexts, but he asserted that the principle had no business in
schools.43 “It may be that the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to be seen not heard,’ but one may,
I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send
children to school on the premise that at their age they need to
learn, not teach,” he wrote.44 For Justice Black, Tinker represented a profound mistake because it “usher[ed] in . . . an entirely
new era in which the power to control pupils . . . in the United

40. Id. at 508-09 (internal citations omitted). Justice Stewart and Justice White each
authored brief concurring opinions. See id. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 515
(White, J., concurring).
41. Fred P. Graham, High Court Upholds a Student Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1969, at 25.
42. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517, 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 522.
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States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court,”
and—if that were not bad enough—also marked “the beginning
of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country.”45
Black further contended that those inclined to protest were the
public schools’ “loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest,
students.”46 In Black’s estimation, Tinker thus did not merely
permit the inmates to run the asylum, but it thrust the least
equipped inmates among them into the warden’s role.
Justice Black did implicitly locate one area of overlap with
the Court’s opinion in Tinker, as he agreed that the case implicated the importance of citizenship.47 But where the majority entertained a broad conception of citizenship—commanding that
schools in a disputatious society should not wantonly squelch dissenting viewpoints—Justice Black floated a comparatively thin
conception of citizenship.48 Instead of focusing on larger societal
considerations, Justice Black’s conception of citizenship resembled the subject found on some elementary students’ report cards,
which extols respect, deference, and obedience toward school officials. “School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral
and important part of training our children to be good citizens—
to be better citizens,” Black contended.49 In the dissent’s final
paragraph, he ominously observed: “One does not need to be a
prophet or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court’s holding today some students in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools
will be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on practically all orders.”50 Black insisted that students should mind their
ps and qs before they worried about expressing their own views.51
Tinker immediately garnered praise for reining in overzealous educators who had trampled upon students’ First Amendment
rights. The New York Times celebrated Tinker, viewing the opinion, with a clear debt to Fortas’s framing, in almost patriotic
45. Id. at 515, 518.
46. Id. at 525.
47. Id. at 524.
48. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 525. Justice Harlan also wrote a short dissenting opinion, which would have
accorded broader deference to school authorities than Tinker allowed. See id. at 526 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 518.
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terms.52 “Freedom of expression—in an open manner by those
holding minority or unpopular views—is part of the vigor and
strength of our schools and society,” the Times editorial argued.53
“So long as it does not obstruct the right of others in the classroom
or on campus, it must be allowed in this country. If dissent ever
has to go underground, America will be in real trouble.”54 Law
professors, even those leaning rightward, generally echoed that
assessment.55 Professor Charles Alan Wright, a lifelong Republican who would join President Richard Nixon’s Watergate legal
team, termed the Tinker decision “an easy one” to rebuff a
“clearly invalid” school policy: “Constitution or no, it is hardly
thinkable that we could deny to today’s generation of students
freedom of expression or procedural fairness.”56
Much of the early Tinker commentary also conspicuously
condemned Justice Black’s dissent. The Washington Post, for example, deemed it “strange” that Tinker drew any dissent at all, let
alone Black’s “harsh” opinion, which it predicted “students of our
judicial history [would find] puzzl[ing].”57
Justice Black’s dissent was not, however, rejected in all
quarters. In an editorial titled “Revolt Invited in the Romper Set,”
the Chicago Tribune endorsed Black’s position, as it condemned
the Supreme Court, “which is always ready to meddle in local
affairs,” and Tinker for rendering it more difficult to “[m]aintain[]
discipline and order in the nation’s schools.”58 While the Tribune
was one of only a handful of major newspapers that criticized
Tinker, the dissent found a welcoming audience among the many
people who wrote Justice Black to commend him on the opinion.59 It is hardly surprising that Black’s opinion won the admiration of school officials, in positions ranging from
52. See Armbands Yes, Miniskirts No, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1969, at 46.
53. .Id.
54. Id.
55. See Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027, 1053, 1086 (1969); Theodore F. Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to
School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 61-62 (1969).
56. Wright, supra note 55, at 1053, 1086.
57. .Freedom of Expression in the Schools, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1969, at A22. The
New York Times called Black’s dissent in Tinker “peppery.” Armbands Yes, Miniskirts No,
supra note 52, at 46.
58. Revolt Invited in the Romper Set, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1969, at 20.
59. Johnson, supra note 16, at 486-90.
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superintendent to cafeteria manager.60 But the appeal of Black’s
position reached beyond its natural constituency. A physician
based in Springfield, Illinois, for example, congratulated Black
for resisting “this [nation’s] new sweeping plague of permissiveness,” a term that quite easily could have appeared in the dissent
itself.61 “[Y]ou speak eloquently my feelings and those of so
many of my countrymen,” the physician noted. “I’m sick and intolerant of permissive parents, permissive teachers, permissive
law enforcement agencies, permissive legislators, and permissive
courts.”62
Justice Black’s vehement dissent in Tinker certainly made a
deep impression on his colleagues, leading Chief Justice Earl
Warren to remark: “Old Hugo really got hung up in his jock strap
on that one.”63 What inspired Black’s stridency in this case? According to one assessment, a searing episode from Black’s familial life spurred him to adopt this hard line against student
speech.64 Proponents of this interpretation note that—after the
oral argument in Tinker, but before the Court issued its decision—
Black’s grandson was suspended for his role in producing an underground newspaper that used intemperate language to criticize
school administrators.65 When Black learned of his grandson’s
suspension and that the family was contemplating a lawsuit
against the school, the Justice penned a letter to his daughter-inlaw condemning the idea in pointed terms. “[P]ersonally I think
the school has done exactly right,” he wrote.66 “The time has
come in this country when it must be known that children cannot
run the school which they attend at government expense.”67 This
anecdote contains irresistible appeal, as Black’s frosty private

60. Id. at 487-88.
61. Id. at 488.
62. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
63. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 592 (2d ed. 1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
64. See, e.g., CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND
COURTS SUBVERT STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 32 (2015) (“Personal considerations may have played a part.”).
65. .See NEWMAN, supra note 63, at 592.
66. .Id.
67. .Id.
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letter about his grandson seems to foreshadow the public posture
he would adopt in Tinker.
Upon deeper reflection, however, it seems mistaken to invest
too much stock in this episode’s explanatory power for Justice
Black’s position on student speech. Some of the reason for caution on this front surrounds the sequence of events. Years before
Tinker arrived at the Court, for instance, Black demonstrated a
willingness to retreat from his traditionally staunch defense of
free speech rights when he confronted cases involving the civil
rights movement’s direct action phase, which can be seen as a
forerunner of the antiwar movement.68 Similarly, at oral argument in Tinker, Black appeared deeply skeptical of First Amendment rights for students, something noted in contemporaneous
media accounts.69 With a tinge of irritation piercing his Alabama
drawl, Black asked the protesting students’ attorney the following
question: “Which do you think has the most control in the school
. . . the pupils or the authorities that are running the school?”70
More importantly, though, it is misguided to construe Justice
Black’s dissent in Tinker primarily as a cranky grandfather’s fit
of pique because that interpretation obscures the prevalence of
such views among Americans during the late-1960s. Instead of
viewing Black’s dissent as the ranting of an elderly codger whose
mischievous grandson caused him to become unhinged, it seems
far more accurate to view him as tapping into a deep wellspring
of cultural anxiety that engulfed the Court’s efforts to extend constitutional rights to students. Moreover, although some readers
may intuit that Black’s sentiments from Tinker have disappeared
in the nearly five decades since the decision, that intuition misses
the mark; Black’s views continue to claim admirers within society, the legal academy, and even on the Supreme Court.
While some observers perceived Tinker’s outcome as inevitable, when assessed from the viewpoint of the 1960s, it seemed
quite plausible that the Supreme Court could have reached
68. See id. at 540-47.
69. See Lyle Denniston, High Court Studies Classroom Protests, EVENING STAR, Nov.
13, 1968, at D-16 (noting Justice Black’s cutting questions at oral argument); Transcript of
Oral Argument at 44-45, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(No. 21) [hereinafter Tinker Transcript]; JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 161.
70. Tinker Transcript, supra note 69, at 44-45.

12

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:1

precisely the opposite outcome. To appreciate how Tinker could
have resulted in a defeat for students’ First Amendment rights,
contemplate that no less a personage than the author of the Court’s
opinion himself viewed the matter as thorny. When Tinker initially arrived at the Court, Justice Fortas wrote, “this is a tough
case” on a law clerk memorandum outlining the students’ petition
for certiorari.71 Fortas eventually voted to deny the students’ petition,72 a stance that (if not overcome by his colleagues) would
have permitted the school officials’ suppression of student speech
to remain intact from their victory at the circuit court level. Even
at oral argument, Fortas’s comments to the students’ lawyer revealed at least some unease at the prospect of finding that the Des
Moines educators’ actions violated the Constitution: “This gets
the Supreme Court of the United States pretty deep in the trenches
of ordinary day to day [school] discipline.”73
The notion that Tinker was far from an assured triumph for
student rights finds further support when one contemplates the
events swirling outside of the Court in the late 1960s. The Court
heard oral arguments in Tinker on November 12, 1968—only ten
weeks after the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was
overshadowed by demonstrations and violence, and exactly one
week after Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey for the
presidency.74 Prior to the election, Nixon’s campaign condemned
the Supreme Court for its supposedly indulgent treatment of the
criminal element, and promised to restore “law and order,” a protean term that encompassed criminal defendants and antiwar protestors alike.75 Against these groups, President Nixon would purport to speak on behalf of the “silent majority,” an assemblage
that was chiefly defined by its not assembling—in order to protest
the Vietnam War, or anything else for that matter.76 In a nod toward Nixon’s “silent majority,” Time designated “The Middle
Americans” its “Man and Woman of the Year” for 1969, and
71. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 287 (1990).
72. Id.
73. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
74. See Allen Rostron, Intellectual Seriousness and the First Amendment’s Protection
of Free Speech for Students, 81 UMKC L. REV. 635, 637-38 (2013).
75. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO
JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 24-35 (2011).
76. Id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
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placed an image of a school on its cover to represent a chief concern for these ordinary folks.77 In the accompanying article, the
Middle Americans were depicted as flaunting an obsessive, flagbearing patriotism, and as “fear[ing] they were beginning to lose
their grip on the country,” as “[o]thers seemed to be taking over—
the liberals, the radicals, the defiant young . . . .”78 Time quoted
a resident of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, who groused: “Dissent is
disgusting. If you have a complaint, write your Congressman or
the President. School is to get an education.”79 This statement
bears an uncanny resemblance to the view offered by the Des
Moines school officials in Tinker who contended that “schools are
no place for demonstrations,” and asserted if students “didn’t like
the way our elected officials were handling things, it should be
handled with the ballot box and not in the halls of our public
schools.”80
During the late 1960s, polling data suggests that more Americans would have embraced Justice Black’s dissent than Justice
Fortas’s majority opinion. In a Harris Poll taken only one month
after Tinker, fifty-two percent of respondents opposed granting
rights to student protesters, and only thirty-eight percent of respondents supported granting such rights.81 When Gallup conducted its first comprehensive poll gauging attitudes toward education in February 1969, moreover, respondents identified a lack
of student discipline as the single leading problem confronting the

77. Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans, TIME, Jan. 5, 1970.
78. Id. at 10. For a useful overview of Tinker’s historical backdrop, see Rostron, supra
note 74, at 638. For insightful examinations of President Nixon’s 1968 campaign and its
legal implications, see generally MCMAHON, supra note 75, at 17-36; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ
& LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (2016);
RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING OF
AMERICA (2008). For penetrating analysis of this Time issue and its implications for schooling debates, see JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 63-64
(2010).
79. Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans, supra note 77, at 13.
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 n. 3 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Freedom of Speech, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 483, 493 (1970)
(The precise question asked: “Do you feel that students have the right to make their protests
or not?”).
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nation’s schools.82 Many respondents doubtless would have identified the behavior at issue in Des Moines, with students disobeying direct orders from their principals, as a cardinal example of
the breakdown in student discipline that must be corrected.
In short, Tinker represented a momentous innovation in the
recognition of students’ constitutional rights. For the first time,
the Supreme Court recognized: students retain the essential power
to communicate their ideas to one another; such communication
is not extraneous to the educational process, but instead forms an
integral part of that process; and public schools have an acute responsibility to tolerate dissident speech, so both the marketplace
of ideas functions properly and citizens will be prepared to participate in the freewheeling debate that characterizes the United
States. Tinker’s constitutional contributions to our society would
deserve to be saluted if they arrived at any time. But that Tinker
resisted, rather than ratified, the era’s prevailing attitudes on student dissent makes those contributions all the more remarkable.
III. TINKER’S CONTINUING VITALITY
Following Tinker’s defense of student speech in 1969, the
Supreme Court has handed students a series of high-profile defeats in this area. In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bethel School
District v. Fraser held that students could be sanctioned for lewd
speech.83 Two years later, the Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier authorized educators to control the content of
school newspapers, even over the objections of student reporters.84 In 2007, the Court in Morse v. Frederick permitted educators to punish students for speech that could be reasonably construed as promoting illicit drug usage.85 Such decisions have
provoked many observers over time to express grave doubts about
whether the First Amendment retains vitality in schools. As early
as 2000, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky queried: “What’s Left of

82. A DECADE OF GALLUP POLLS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD EDUCATION 1969-1978 20
(Stanley M. Elam ed. 1978).
83. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
84. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
85. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
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Tinker?”86 His assessment registered somewhere between not
much and nothing at all.87 Chemerinsky contended that the Supreme Court “views schools as authoritarian institutions,” to
which it all-too-readily deferred: “[T]he Tinker majority’s approach to student speech is no longer followed; the subsequent
cases are much closer to Justice Black’s dissent than to Justice
Fortas’s majority opinion.”88 Frederick, of course, did nothing to
tamp down such dire evaluations. In 2009, Professor Perry Zirkel
asserted that Fraser and Frederick had “deflected the import of
the Tinker opinion to the point of practically reversing or, at least,
effectively compartmentalizing it[,]”89 and a law review article
likewise contended that the Court’s decisions have “render[ed]
Tinker negligible to a large extent.”90
Reports of Tinker’s demise have, however, been greatly exaggerated. While the Court’s post-Tinker opinions should not be
dismissed as inconsequential, neither should they be viewed as
draining student speech of all vitality. The Supreme Court in Fraser and Frederick did not purport to undercut Tinker’s core contribution: students, typically, continue to possess the right to express themselves in schools, even if educators dislike their
messages. The Court’s subsequent opinions can plausibly be
viewed as retreating in particular areas—involving speech that is
lewd, school-sponsored, or pro-drug.91 But it is implausible to
contend that those decisions indicate that Tinker has been hollowed out entirely, so that only its edifice remains. To the contrary, today’s students enjoy far greater First Amendment protections than did their counterparts in the pre-Tinker era.92
Lower courts often issue decisions permitting students to express themselves, even over the objections of school
86. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000).
87. See id. at 529.
88. Id. at 541.
89. Perry A. Zirkel, The Rocket’s Red Glare: The Largely Errant and Deflected Flight
of Tinker, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 597 (2009).
90. Piotr Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference,
and Confusion Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1059, 1099 (2009).
91. .See Banasiak, supra note 89, at 1060-61.
92. See generally Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the
Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions—for the Law and for the
Litigants, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1407 (2011).
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administrators. In recent years, for example, the federal judiciary
has issued opinions vindicating students’ speech rights to: oppose
President George W. Bush by wearing a T-shirt that refers to him
as an “International Terrorist”;93 advance gay equality by wearing
items that read “Gay? Fine by Me,” “I Support Gays,” and “ProGay Marriage”;94 and support a national breast cancer awareness
campaign by wearing a bracelet that reads “I ♥ boobies!”95
After Tinker, moreover, some lower courts have even held
that student hecklers must not be permitted to veto student
speech.96 In 2004, for example, a federal appellate court upheld
a student’s right to thrust his fist in the air as his classmates recited
the Pledge of Allegiance, even though the school contended that
other students would react with hostility to his silent protest.97 In
doing so, the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the notion that
Tinker must permit hecklers to veto student speech:
If certain bullies are likely to act violently when a student wears long hair, it is unquestionably easy for a
principal to preclude the outburst by preventing the student from wearing long hair. To do so, however, is to
sacrifice freedom upon the alt[a]r of order, and allow
the scope of our liberty to be dictated by the inclinations
of the unlawful mob . . . . The fact that other students
might take such a hairstyle as an incitement to violence
is an indictment of those other students, not long hair
. . . . While the same constitutional standards do not always apply in public schools as on public streets, we
cannot afford students less constitutional protection
simply because their peers might illegally express disagreement through violence instead of reason.98
One particularly notable anti-heckler’s veto decision occurred in 1980 when a high school senior in Rhode Island named
Aaron Fricke wished to bring another young man to prom as his
93. Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
94. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Cty., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
95. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2013).
96. For the foundational work coining “the heckler’s veto,” see HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (1965).
97. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004).
98. Id. Lower courts have frequently vindicated the desire of students to sit during the
Pledge of Allegiance. See Banks v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade Cty., 314 F. Supp. 285,
294-95 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
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date.99 School administrators responded that Fricke could not do
so because they could not guarantee his safety against attacks
from his classmates—an assertion that had at least some factual
basis because the school recently witnessed physical altercations
over sexual orientation.100 Nevertheless, the district court invalidated the school’s response as impermissibly infringing upon
Fricke’s First Amendment expressive rights.101 To rule otherwise, the court explained, would endorse “mob rule,” and “completely subvert free speech in the schools by granting other students a ‘heckler’s veto,’ allowing them to decide through—
prohibited and violent methods—what speech will be heard.”102
In 2000, a Massachusetts Superior Court relied upon that decision
to invalidate a school’s effort to prohibit a transgendered student
from wearing clothing to school that corresponded to her gender
identity.103
Perhaps even more revealing of Tinker’s legacy than these
judicial opinions, though, are the many instances in recent years
where educators have initially sought to suppress student speech
only to realize that their stance cannot be squared with the Constitution. Following this pattern, school districts have retreated
from efforts to prohibit students from: displaying a pin featuring
the Palestinian flag;104 expressing pro-life views by wearing a Tshirt that reads “Abortion Kills Kids”;105 and voicing solidarity
with the Black Lives Matter movement by wearing “I Can’t
Breathe” T-shirts in honor of the dying words that Eric Garner
wheezed as a police officer choked him.106 If Tinker were truly
as feeble as some observers maintain, educators in these examples—and many others besides—would have squelched these instances of student expression with impunity.
99. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.R.I. 1980).
100. Id. at 383-84.
101. Id. at 388.
102. Id. at 387.
103. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000).
104. Tamar Lewin, High School Tells Student to Remove Antiwar Shirt, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb 26, 2003, at A12.
105. John Carlson, Anti-Abortion Message Meets Zero Tolerance, DES MOINES
REGISTER, May 4, 2005, at 11A.
106. Veronica Rocha, Players Allowed to Wear Protest Shirts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2015, at AA4.
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While Tinker is best construed as retaining vitality, that position should be not mistaken for complacency, contending that
all is well with the First Amendment in schools. Today, two primary areas stand out as demanding significant interventions.
First, although some judges have wisely rejected hecklers’ efforts
to veto speech, such opinions are sporadic rather than universal.
Lower courts still too frequently indulge that practice and rely
upon related techniques in order to uphold schools’ efforts to silence student speech on contentious issues. Second, lower courts
have permitted school officials to exert excessive authority over
student speech that is articulated off-campus.
Lower courts’ mistreatment of heckler’s veto cases poses a
grave threat to student expression. Federal courts too often permit
schools to stifle student expression of views on divisive topics—
including on questions of national significance. Consider a few
examples. In 2007, a federal district court in southern Texas upheld a school’s decision to prohibit students from wearing Tshirts that read “Border Patrol” and “We Are Not Criminals” as
methods of expressing competing positions on unauthorized immigration.107 In 2014, the Ninth Circuit upheld a northern California school’s decision to prohibit students from wearing clothes
featuring images of the American flag on the day celebrating
Cinco de Mayo.108 The courts in those two cases found that the
schools’ actions were justified because the contested speech had
generated angry reactions and even threats from classmates—
classic instances of the heckler’s veto at work.109 Even when
schools cannot persuasively claim that student speech caused any
tempers to flare or disruption of school activities, however, courts
have nonetheless sometimes upheld bans on expression about divisive topics. In 2006, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
southern California school’s decision to prohibit a student from
wearing a T-shirt, in protest of a school-sanctioned Day of Silence, that read “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY
IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27.’”110 In 2010, moreover, the Sixth
107.
108.
109.
110.

Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d. 425, 427-28 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 764, 767, 781 (9th Cir. 2014).
Madrid, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 435-36; Dariano, 767 F.3d at 777-78.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2006).
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Circuit upheld a Tennessee school’s ban of clothes featuring the
Confederate flag when a student wore a T-shirt with the controversial emblem, and text reading: “If you have a problem with
this flag you need a history lesson.”111
The desire of schools to curtail speech on these acrimonious
topics is certainly understandable. Few topics have demonstrated
the ability to stir passions more intensely in recent years than unauthorized immigration, cultural assimilation among Mexican
Americans, the quest for gay equality, and the Confederate flag’s
relationship to racial subordination. Nevertheless, the courts, in
my view, erred by permitting these speech prohibitions in all four
of these instances. Students in the above cases who disagreed
with the messages they believed their classmates were conveying
should have either informed them of their disagreement, or—if
they could not manage to do so in a composed fashion—simply
ignored them. In the marketplace of ideas, boycotts too can sometimes be an effective instrument for change.
Contemplate each of the four cases in turn. While there can
be no doubt that the topic of immigration reform generates strong
feelings and that some students on both sides of the debate may
well feel affronted by those T-shirts, schools should not take it
upon themselves to ban this sort of communication on this vital
topic. If students either threaten their classmates or if an outbreak
of violence occurs, the students who are responsible for actually
causing those disruptions should be disciplined, not the speaker.
That same analysis pertains to the students who threatened violence against classmates who displayed the American flag on
Cinco de Mayo. I maintain that view even though I well understand that some celebrants may genuinely feel aggrieved by classmates who display Old Glory on the lone day during the entire
school year set aside to honor Mexican heritage. In both instances, however, rewarding angry hecklers by silencing speakers
incentivizes students in precisely the wrong manner.
The remaining two cases present closer calls. The student
who opposed the Day of Silence sought to express his religiousbased opposition to the school’s embrace of gay equality; he
111. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 329, 342 (6th Cir. 2010); Complaint at 3, Defoe v.
Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (No. 06CV00450).
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expressed that position without resorting to epithets, and it is difficult to know how he could have expressed his particular view
(which is distinct from expressing pride in heterosexuality) in a
way that educators would have deemed permissible. Although I
vehemently disagree with the T-shirt’s stance and regard it as animated by antigay sentiment, I also believe that a school should
not make it virtually impossible to express a particular viewpoint—especially when that opinion opposes the school’s own
position. Finally, the Confederate flag case presents, in my estimation, the most vexing case of all. I associate that flag primarily
with an expression of racial hostility, and for that reason detest it.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that it usually connotes a threat of
violence, as is true with burning crosses. Ultimately, my assessment that this school’s ban on the Confederate flag should not
have been permitted to stand is due in no small part to the accompanying action it took to make that ban viable. To comply with
the requirement for viewpoint neutrality, the school also barred
paraphernalia promoting Malcolm X.112 While it is far from clear
that the opposite view of the Confederate flag is actually communicated by a Malcolm X hat—rather than, say, the American
flag—it does seem clear that public schools are spectacularly illsuited to making that determination.
Consider a few more broadly applicable reasons why upholding these bans on student speech may have been unwise in
these cases. First, validating these bans sends the message that
particular groups of students may be more psychologically fragile
and lacking in self-control than actually seems warranted. Second, because the bans apply only within school, it seems important to remember that these groups of students may well encounter versions of this speech outside of school—and that they
may be less adept at navigating those situations because the experience is unfamiliar. Third, the bans seem unlikely to rid the
school of the disfavored message because clever students can locate alternate phrasing or symbols to serve as a substitute for the
prohibited speech. (Contemplate, for example, how the Confederate flag could be swapped for iconic images of Robert E. Lee.)
Fourth, the bans themselves may even prove counterproductive
112. Defoe, 625 F.3d at 337.
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because they render particular expression taboo, which will for
some subset of students elevate its status and make it more attractive, precisely because it is forbidden in school.
An additional area of concern involves the ability of educators to sanction students for comments made off-campus but
online, whose effects may eventually be felt within the school—
an issue of ever-increasing significance during the internet era.
To date, the Supreme Court has studiously evaded this question,
despite being presented with numerous viable opportunities to
consider it.113 The Court’s reticence on this front seems regrettable because ample evidence suggests that lower courts have generally taken an unduly deferential approach to articulating legal
standards for school regulations regarding off-campus speech.114
The downside of the judiciary’s lax approach to protecting
students’ off-campus speech is seldom more apparent than when
students use harsh language to criticize school officials. In one
particularly egregious example, the Second Circuit in 2011 found
that a Connecticut high school did not violate Avery Doninger’s
clearly established First Amendment rights when it punished the
eleventh grader in her capacity as Junior Class Secretary for calling school administrators “douchebags” in a blog post written
from her home during non-school hours.115 The dispute arose
when an administrator informed students that “Jamfest,” an annual battle-of-the-bands concert, could not be held in the school’s
new auditorium on the upcoming weekend as previously
planned.116 That evening, Doninger took to her personal blog—
unaffiliated with the high school’s website—and encouraged
readers to contact school administrators (whom she termed “the
douchebags in central office”) to register their displeasure with
the changed plans for Jamfest.117 Doninger’s post, along with an
email campaign that she coordinated, succeeded in motivating
many people to call the school; the unusually high volume of
phone calls, in turn, caused some tumult within the central

113.
114.
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office.118 After the school learned of the blog, it punished Doninger by prohibiting her from running for election as Senior Class
Secretary as she had intended.119 Nevertheless, the federal appellate court refused to find that the school’s sanctioning of Doninger
violated her First Amendment rights, reasoning that “it was objectively reasonable for school officials to conclude that Doninger’s behavior was potentially disruptive of student government
functions (such as the organization of Jamfest) and that Doninger
was not free to engage in such behavior while serving as a class
representative.”120
Fortunately, federal appellate courts have not universally
rubberstamped schools’ efforts to sanction students for off-campus speech that criticizes educators. In 2011, the Third Circuit
found a free speech violation when a Pennsylvania school suspended an eighth-grade student—identified by the courts as
J.S.—for creating a vulgar, absurd MySpace121 The online profile
for the Alabama principal J.S. dubbed “M-Hoe”—which she created from her home computer, and made accessible only to approved users—contained the following greeting:
HELLO CHILDREN. yes. it’s your oh so wonderful,
hairy, expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this
world with a small dick PRINCIPAL. I have come to
myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principals
to be just like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled.
Another reason I came to myspace is because—I am
keeping an eye on you students (whom I care for so
much). For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t
in my school, I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long
walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but
not least my darling wife who looks like a man.122
In the section listing M-Hoe’s general interests, J.S. included
the following: “detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain,
spending time with my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball,
my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students and their
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120.
121.
122.

Id. at 341.
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Doninger, 642 F.3d at 351.
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parents.”123 Despite the precautions J.S. took limiting access to
the profile, and the absence of evidence that it significantly disturbed school proceedings, her principal nevertheless suspended
J.S. for ten days after he learned of its existence.124 The Third
Circuit, however, invalidated the suspension, reasoning: “The
profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did. Thus, it was clearly not reasonably foreseeable that J.S.’s speech would create a substantial disruption or
material interference in school.”125 As the Third Circuit further
explained in a companion case released the same day: “It would
be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in the
guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that
child when he/she participates in school sponsored activities.”126
The finding of a First Amendment violation here seems
plainly appropriate with respect to J.S.’s suspension. As the Third
Circuit suggests, schools should not rely upon the existence of the
internet to render actionable students’ off-campus disparagement
of educators—particularly when the critiques are clearly satirical.
At the same time, though, if forced to select only Doninger’s post
or J.S.’s profile as meriting First Amendment protection, it seems
difficult to escape the conclusion that the First Amendment
should be understood as more readily protecting Doninger than
J.S. On first impression, Doninger’s protest over “Jamfest” may
seem to involve a frivolous issue; the Constitution does not recognize a fundamental right to rock out. But Doninger’s protest
should not be dismissed because it can also be viewed as raising
important questions of democratic representation and the importance of government accountability. Recall that Doninger’s
speech involved an issue that directly criticized the governance of
her school, and encouraged her classmates and fellow citizens in
effect to petition the government about a grievance, a right that
receives independent protection under the First Amendment.
Moreover, although the Second Circuit appeared to regard Doninger’s punishment of being banned from serving in the student
123.
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government as lighter than a suspension, it seems plausible that
this particular sanction may actually be graver in this context.
The school is in effect sanctioning Doninger for daring to speak
out against the local government by stripping her of the ability to
occupy a formal leadership position and also prohibiting her
classmates from voting for her. Finally, regarding the language
itself, Doninger’s usage of “douchebag,” while pejorative, commonly appeared on network television shows, and by the time that
she used the term it had largely been severed from a connection
to anything literal. In contrast to Doninger’s speech, J.S.’s mock
profile was by her own testimony designed to amuse because it
was “outrageous,” not to communicate any serious idea, and used
shocking language to achieve its intended effect. It seems downright bizarre to think that Avery Doninger would have had better
luck prevailing on her First Amendment claim if, in addition to
calling school officials “douchebags,” she remarked upon their
genitalia, suggested they were pedophiles, and insulted their relatives’ physical appearances.127
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the sometimes-ugly content of student speech today,
some readers may now have greater sympathy for the notion that
Justice Black voiced long ago in Tinker, contending students do
not know enough to express views that enjoy First Amendment
protection in schools. Judge Richard Posner offered a somewhat
softened version of this claim in 2008, when he wrote an opinion
for the Seventh Circuit that voiced deep hesitation about the wisdom of having the federal judiciary review free speech determinations made by educators, even as he sided with the student in
the immediate case.128 “A heavy federal constitutional hand on
the regulation of student speech by school authorities would make
little sense,” Judge Posner posited, because “[t]he contribution
that kids can make to the marketplace in ideas and opinions is
modest.”129
127. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 921; see also Edward Wyatt, It Turns Out You Can Say
That on Television, Over and Over, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.
128. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671-72
(7th Cir. 2008).
129. Id. at 671.
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This effort to diminish the importance of conferring First
Amendment rights on students, however, elicited a powerful,
rousing response from Judge Ilana Rovner:
Youth are often the vanguard of social change. Anyone
who thinks otherwise has not been paying attention to
the civil rights movement, the women’s rights movement, the anti-war protests for Vietnam and Iraq, and
the [2008] presidential primaries where the youth voice
and the youth vote are having a substantial impact . . . .
The young adults to whom the majority refers as “kids”
and “children” are either already eligible, or a few short
years away from being eligible to vote, to contract, to
marry, to serve in the military, and to be tried as adults
in criminal prosecutions. To treat them as children in
need of protection from controversy . . . is contrary to
the values of the First Amendment.130
Students, as Judge Rovner attests, have made valuable contributions to the nation’s marketplace of ideas, and the school itself has often been an important site for exchanging ideas on the
topic of the day. As the preceding material establishes, moreover,
the judiciary played a critical role in ensuring that students retain
the ability to speak out on these issues—even if educators themselves have initially dismissed their statements as incoherent, incorrect, or irrelevant. When schools have sought to prevent students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War—
when educators have tried to stop students from revealing their
sexual orientation through their prom dates or their gender identity through their clothing choices—it seems clear that majoritarian sentiment within those communities would have supported the
schools. While many observers now view those student messages
as presenting valued input to our schools and our polity, they were
not always so considered at the outset. Yet courts nevertheless
prohibited educators from banning those contested student messages. The First Amendment provides space to disfavored ideas
today in the event that they may, over time, flourish and perhaps
eventually become the dominant view. Make no mistake, though:
students will not invariably avail themselves of the space created
by the First Amendment to articulate ideas that ultimately become
130. Id. at 677-78 (Rovner, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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the wave of the future. Instead, much of what students say will
no doubt seem puerile, spiteful, ill-conceived, and wrongheaded—initial impressions that the passage of time will only cement. On this score, though, it is essential to appreciate that
speech from students has no small amount in common with
speech from adults.

